The Struggle for Tamil Eelam and India-Sri Lanka Relations
8 March 2024 . #2403 .
Sreeja G. and M. Mayilvaganan examines the Tamil Eelam Movement in Sri Lanka, past and present, and its impact on India and its ties with Sri Lanka.
In the context of the post-war landscape in Sri Lanka, there has been a consistent and widespread call for “a political solution,” which entails some form of “autonomous self-rule” for the Tamils through the 13th amendment. This call has been articulated both within the country and on the global stage. Particularly, the persistent call for a fair resolution of the fundamental issues at the heart of the conflict between the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamils through political dialogue is a key aspect of India’s foreign policy towards Sri Lanka. The pursuit of Tamil self-governance within the Sri Lankan State, along with efforts for conflict resolution in Sri Lanka, has historically shaped Sri Lanka’s relationship with India.
This article examines the Tamil Eelam Movement in Sri Lanka, past and present, and its impact on India and its ties with Sri Lanka. Notably, this article intends to analyze and provide answers to the following inquiries: Is the demand for Tamil Eelam still prominent among the Tamil population in Sri Lanka? What factors contribute to the sustenance of Tamil nationalism, if not the call for Eelam, despite the dissolution of the Tamil Tigers over a decade ago? What are the reasons behind the reluctance of many Tamils in Sri Lanka and abroad to embrace a Sri Lankan political identity? What is the rationale behind the insistence of India and other Western nations on a political resolution, even after the conclusion of the war?
Sinhalese-Tamil Binary
The history of the Sri Lankan polity is indeed multifaceted and has been characterized by complex conflicts over many centuries. One of the central conflicts revolves around the Sinhala versus Tamil binary, which encompasses the debate over who originally occupied the island and the subsequent struggle for self-rule by the Tamil population in post-colonial Sri Lanka. In fact, the origins of the Sinhala versus Tamil conflict can be traced back to competing narratives regarding the early inhabitation of the island, with both communities laying claim to a historical precedence. This historical debate has contributed to animosities and power struggles, resulting in enduring tensions and periodic outbreaks of violence. Furthermore, the demand for self-rule by the Tamil population following Sri Lanka’s independence has been a focal point in the country’s post-colonial history, leading to political movements, armed conflicts, and international attention to the plight of the Tamil community.
The ethnic nationalist ideology advocated by moderate Tamil leaders during the 1970s and subsequently upheld by the Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), also known as Tamil Tigers remains the predominant guiding principle of the Tamil political landscape in present-day Sri Lanka and within the Tamil Diaspora. This ideology revolves around the pursuit of cultural and political parity.
The deep-rooted historical contestation significantly shaped the sociopolitical landscape of the country, influencing governance, identity, and interethnic relations. In addition, the intricate and conflict-ridden nature of the Sri Lankan political landscape highlights the enduring challenges and grievances that have left a mark on the country’s social and political framework, posing significant obstacles to achieving reconciliation and sustainable peace.
The Call for Tamil Eelam
Based on the classical work ‘Mahavamsa,’ also known as the Great Chronicle, an epic written in Pali language, the earliest historical account of Sri Lanka dates back to the 5th Century BCE. According to this account, the Sinhalese, an Indo-Aryan race and the largest ethnic group in Sri Lanka, are said to have arrived from India. Subsequently, around the 3rd Century BCE during the Chola period in India, Tamils of the Dravidian race migrated to Sri Lanka as traders and invaders. However, Sri Lankan Tamil historians dispute this, claiming that they were settled in Sri Lanka before the arrival of the Sinhalese. Over the following centuries, the Buddhist Sinhalese and Hindu Tamils were said to have contested for the domination of the island nation’s affairs.
Sri Lanka’s colonial history commenced with the arrival of the Portuguese in 1505, subsequently followed by the Dutch in 1658, and culminating in its status as a British colony in 1815. The British influence endured until 1948, when Sri Lanka achieved independence. The post-colonial era in Sri Lanka exposed a land marked by tension among numerous large and small ethnic groups, each possessing distinct cultures, languages, and religions. As indicated in the 1981 census, the ethnic composition of the Sri Lankan population is reported as follows: Sinhalese – 74%, Sri Lankan Tamils – 12.6%, Sri Lankan Moors – 7%, and Indian Tamils – 5.6%.
The majority Sinhalese and minority Tamils had a tumultuous relationship regarding governance of the northern region, where the Tamil ethnic group resided. The Tamil Eelam movement emerged as a manifestation of Tamil nationalism, led by Tamil national organizations in the post-colonial era of Sri Lanka. Eelam represents the ancient Tamil nomenclature for the island of Sri Lanka. The movement campaigned for the creation of a separate Tamil state in the northern and eastern areas of Sri Lanka. It aimed to champion the rights of the Tamil-speaking community, encompassing Sri Lankan Tamils, Sri Lankan Moors, and Plantation Tamils (Indian Tamils).
Notably, the movement of Tamil Eelam can be categorized into three phases based on its objectives and methods. Firstly, there was a moderate Parliamentarian movement advocating for a Federal State. Secondly, there was a movement for the separate state of Tamil Eelam through democratic means. Lastly, there was a militant Tamil separatist movement.
During the 1950s, the Illankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK), commonly known as the Federal Party (FP) and led by Tamil lawyer and politician S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, advocated for an autonomous Tamil state within a federal system. This proposed system aimed to decentralize power to the Tamil-dominated areas of the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka. The goal was to grant autonomy to the Tamil regions of Sri Lanka and to foster a united nation where the Sinhalese majority and Tamil minority would be treated as equals.
By the mid-1970s, the demand for autonomy within a greater federal system transitioned to Tamil separatism. In 1968, V. Navaratnam of the FP advocated for a separate state for the Tamils. Subsequently, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) declared its support for an independent Tamil Eelam through the Vaddukoddai Resolution in 1976. The TULF united other political organizations, including youth movements of Sri Lankan Tamils and Indian Tamils, under a common platform for the joint parliamentary struggle for Tamil Eelam, encompassing the northern and eastern provinces of the country.
The shift occurred due to economic oppression faced by the Tamils and political domination by a majoritarian Sinhala state over the Tamil minority. This included the denial of citizenship to Indian Tamils, the introduction of the Sinhala Only Act which made Sinhala the sole official language, standardization of education where university admissions favored Sinhalese, a series of anti-Tamil pogroms during 1956, 1958, 1977, and 1983, the failure of the Sri Lankan Parliament to implement Sinhalese-Tamil Pacts like the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact and the Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact, and finally, Sri Lanka’s adoption of a new Constitution in 1972 formalizing Sinhala-Buddhist supremacy.
Thus, the marginalization of Tamils and the state-endorsed violence against them served to bolster the Eelam movement. This, in turn, contributed to the emergence of Tamil separatist militant factions in Sri Lanka, ultimately assuming a prominent role in the political landscape from the early 1980s onward.
In 1972, a group of young Tamils established the Tamil New Tigers, which later evolved into the Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 1976, with Velupillai Prabhakaran as its leader. Other significant militant factions included the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), the Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF), the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), and the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS). Over time, the LTTE systematically eliminated all rival groups, with the goal of establishing a separate Tamil Eelam through armed resistance.
Political Contestation to Armed Conflict
The post-colonial politics in Sri Lanka has resulted in significant polarization within the society. Particularly, the anti-Tamil violence in the years of 1977 and 1983 led to disillusionment among young Tamils, causing them to turn to armed resistance as they lost confidence in the moderate leaders of their community and in democratic means. This ultimately resulted in the armed conflict in Sri Lanka, in a sense the armed struggle for Tamil Eelam, which can be divided into four distinct phases, is outlined below.
Eelam War I (1983-1987): After a local ethnic confrontation, an armed conflict erupted at the Jaffna Peninsula in 1983, resulting in the loss of 13 soldiers’ lives at the hands of the LTTE. This event led to retaliatory actions against Tamil civilians by the Sinhalese, forcing many to seek refuge in Tamil-dominated areas in Sri Lanka and India. Subsequently, the Tamil Tigers declared the First Eelam War in 1983 with the objective of establishing a separate Tamil state in northern Sri Lanka known as ‘Eelam’. In 1987, India dispatched a Peacekeeping Force to quell the conflict, but this effort ultimately proved unsuccessful. Concurrently, Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa compelled the Indian government to withdraw its peacekeepers in 1990. The following year, the LTTE was held accountable for the assassinations of Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, and Sri Lankan President Premadasa in 1993.
Eelam War II (1990-1994): After the withdrawal of the Indian peacekeeping force, the situation deteriorated, leading to the eruption of the second Eelam war. The conflict was ignited when the LTTE perpetrated the killing of 600 surrendered police officers in the eastern province on June 11, 1990. This event prompted the Sri Lankan government to declare an all-out war against the LTTE, subsequently initiating aerial bombardment. In retaliation, the Tigers carried out mass killings of hundreds of Sinhalese and other villagers. Consequently, both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government were involved in severe human rights violations, resulting in the deaths of civilians. In 1991, the Tamil Tigers besieged the government army base camp at Elephant Pass, a crucial strategic point in the region, and brought Jaffna under its control, leading to heightened tensions in the area. The Tamils affected by the conflict sought refuge in India.
Eelam War III (1995-2002): After a period of relative tranquility, the Third Eelam War was reignited following the sinking of two Navy boats by the LTTE, thereby violating the peace negotiations between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. In response, the government proclaimed a “war for peace” and launched an extensive military campaign aimed at recapturing the Jaffna peninsula, which had been seized by the LTTE previously. Consequently, numerous Tamils were compelled to seek refuge elsewhere. The LTTE carried out widespread attacks on the government, army, and Sinhala civilian targets. In late 1990, there were bomb attacks in Colombo and southern cities. The LTTE targeted the Central Bank, World Trade Centre, and the Temple of Tooth. In February 2002, a ceasefire agreement was signed between LTTE and the government, with Norway as the mediator. However, a year later, LTTE withdrew from the talks and claimed control of the north and east regions of the country.
Final Eelam War (2006-2009): The conclusive phase of the military campaign for Eelam commenced when the LTTE obstructed the Mavil Aru anicut, prompting the Government to utilize force to unblock the channel. This led to the air force bombing LTTE camps around Mavil Aru anicut on July 29, 2006. Tragic events targeting civilians on both sides led to the loss of thousands of lives over the years. The army successfully removed the Tamil Tigers from the critical coastal city of Sampur. After the Geneva Peace talks failed, the Rajapaksa government launched a major military offensive against the LTTE strongholds in the northern and eastern regions of Sri Lanka with the goal of decisively defeating the LTTE. In May 2009, the government claimed victory over the LTTE by eliminating the LTTE leader Prabaharan, thus ending a 26-year insurgency. Throughout the course of the civil war, both the Sri Lankan state and LTTE were held responsible for gross human rights violations. A 2011 report by the UN Secretary-General Panel of Experts identified as many as 40,000 civilian deaths.
Tamil Eelam Campaign in Today’s Post-War Sri Lanka
Following the end of the war, there has been a general appeal for Tamil autonomy, not Eelam, within Sri Lankan Tamils. This demand is also echoed by the international community. While Tamil nationalism was very effective and did challenge the state brutally from the 1980s to the mid-2000s, but today after the war is over, the appeal for Tamil Eelam is apparently flimsy. Several factors contribute to this perception. The defeat of the LTTE in 2009 marked a significant turning point, leading to a reduction in the intensity of the Tamil nationalist movement. Additionally, the political parties representing the Sri Lankan Tamil community are currently focused on rebuilding their political identity and securing their future within the altered geopolitical context, rather than persisting with the call for Eelam, following the absence of the LTTE. In fact, these parties have found themselves obligated to adjust their strategies and goals in response to the domestic and international political landscape, endeavoring to participate in governance and policy formation within the established Sri Lankan framework.
In doing so, Sri Lankan Tamil parties are navigating complex challenges, including the reconciliation of diverse perspectives within the Tamil community, forming alliances with other political entities, and addressing the concerns of the broader Sri Lankan Tamil population and diaspora. In short, The focus is now on establishing one’s own political brand and attaining success within a democratic framework, marking a shift away from the militant resistance that defined the era of the LTTE.
Similarly, while the civilian Sri Lankan Tamils continue to grapple with agony and concerns, particularly regarding issues such as land rights, disappearances of their loved ones, and the overall pace of progress in addressing Tamil grievances, the predominant focus of them today is finding better livelihood options for them and their children rather than persisting with the demand for Tamil Eelam.
At the same time, many Tamils in Sri Lanka and abroad are reluctant to adopt a Sri Lankan political identity due to deeply entrenched historical, social, and political reasons. The feelings of marginalization and alienation among the Tamil population persist, and there is resentment towards the successive Sinhalese-dominated governments. The enduring legacy of violence and human rights violations during the civil war has only served to exacerbate feelings of fear and distrust, making it difficult for many Tamils to align themselves with a Sri Lankan political identity.
On the contrary, the Tamil diaspora remains inactive and divided regarding the future direction to pursue on the new paths ahead, amidst the absence of a strong domestic party to lead the Eelam campaign. Their actions are influenced by both internal and external dynamics.
Finally, the current administration in Sri Lanka, led by President Ranil Wickremesinghe, expressing a commitment to the integration of the Tamil minority by contemplating the devolution of power through the 13th Amendment to the Constitution, has caused a significant shift in the mindset of Tamil nationalists.
Despite this, there are those who posit that the present advocacy for Tamil self-governance should not be summarily disregarded. This is because historical grievances and the desire for autonomy persist as influential factors in shaping Sri Lanka’s political environment.
Eelam, 13th Amendment and India
The demand for Tamil Eelam and subsequent wars in Sri Lanka has inflamed public sentiments in India, particularly in the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu through the arrival of large scale Tamil refugees and ultimately the bilateral relationship between New Delhi and Colombo. Importantly, the disenfranchisement of Indian or Hill Country Tamils, the anti-Tamil riots of 1983, and the subsequent influx of refugees to India, mainly to Tamil Nadu, evoked sympathy and concern for Sri Lankan Tamils in the state of Tamil Nadu.
Importantly, the influx of Tamil refugees into India was driven by the threat of persecution, physical harm, and death at the hands of warring parties, along with the prevailing insecurity due to the conflict. This influx played a significant role in fostering sympathy and concern in India, consequently shaping India’s relations with Colombo. During Eelam War I (1983-87), approximately 134,053 Sri Lankan Tamils sought refuge in the state of Tamil Nadu. Subsequently, a second massive flow of Tamil refugees occurred during Eelam War II, with around 122,078 seeking refuge in Tamil Nadu. During the third Eelam War, a total of 22,418 Tamil refugees sought refuge in India by the conclusion of 2003. Furthermore, in the closing stages of the war, approximately 24,512 Sri Lankan Tamils found sanctuary in India.
Political parties in Tamil Nadu called for robust Indian intervention in Sri Lanka to safeguard Sri Lankan Tamils from the Sinhalese-dominated state. This domestic pressure coupled with security concern played a pivotal role in compelling India to involve itself in Sri Lankan affairs. The subsequent Sri Lanka Accord in 1987 and the deployment of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to Jaffna were intended to address the ethnic issue in Sri Lanka and alleviate the political tensions in India’s relationship with Sri Lanka. However, the assassination of the former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by the LTTE in May 1991 led India to adopt a more hands-off approach to Sri Lankan affairs. Subsequently, the Indian government even took steps to establish closer state-to-state relations with the Sri Lankan government.
The shared ethnic, linguistic, and cultural identity among the Tamil communities in India and Sri Lanka, along with a sense of unity stemming from Tamil Nationalism, led to domestic pressure on the Indian government. This was compounded by the geopolitical necessity, influencing the evolution of India’s foreign policy towards Sri Lanka.
The quest for a fair political resolution of Tamil issues in Sri Lanka has been a consistent focus for India. The call for the implementation of the 13th amendment in Sri Lanka by India is a significant aspect of this ongoing quest. This amendment, which was introduced as a result of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of 1987, aimed to devolve power to the provinces and address the aspirations of the Tamil community in Sri Lanka.
The 13th amendment is viewed as a crucial step towards achieving meaningful devolution of power and promoting the rights of minority communities in Sri Lanka, particularly the Tamil population. India’s stance on this matter underscores its commitment to the welfare and rights of Tamil people in the region.
The push for the implementation of the 13th amendment reflects India’s proactive engagement in advocating for a sustainable and inclusive political framework in Sri Lanka. This ongoing commitment is rooted in the shared historical and cultural ties between India and Sri Lanka, as well as a dedication to promoting peace, stability, and harmony in the region.
Conclusion
The trajectory of Tamil nationalism post-war reflects a shifting landscape marked by evolving dynamics. While the fervor may have dimmed in the aftermath of conflict, the underlying aspirations for self-governance persist, albeit in a more nuanced and complex manner. This nuanced evolution encompasses a multifaceted reality, shaped by historical legacies, contemporary socio-political forces, and the interplay of regional and global influences. Within this intricate tapestry, the narrative of Tamil nationalism continues to unfold, embodying a spectrum of aspirations, grievances, and expressions that defy simple categorization. As such, the post-war phase has not signaled the conclusion of Tamil nationalism, but rather its adaptation and reconfiguration within the intricacies of contemporary contexts, laying bare the enduring nature of the underlying issues and aspirations of Tamils for more dignified life and livelihoods.
The aspirations of the Tamil community in Sri Lanka and the Tamil diaspora is for a degree of self-governance now rather than Eelam. The call for a dignified political equality and a reasonable level of autonomy within the Sri Lankan framework remains a prominent issue. It is imperative for the Sri Lankan government to adopt a more accommodating stance towards the demand for self-governance among the Tamil population. By granting some form of autonomy at the provincial level, the government would not only address the aspirations of the ethnic minorities but also contribute to a more harmonious and inclusive future for Sri Lanka. Recognizing and respecting the cultural and political identity of the Tamil community is essential for fostering long-term stability and unity within the nation.
Given the historical, cultural, and political dynamics at play in the region, Sri Lanka’s failure to address the aspirations of minority groups could potentially have spillover effects on India, with possible cross-border implications.
Ms. Sreeja G is Assistant Professor at the Department of History and Politics, Sree Sankara College, Kalady, India and Dr. M. Mayilvaganan is Director of CHSIA.
Views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the CHSIA.